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Abstract. Security is a crucial issue for information systems. Traditionally, 
security is considered after the definition of the system. However, this approach 
often leads to problems, which translate into security vulnerabilities. From the 
viewpoint of the traditional security paradigm, it should be possible to eliminate 
such problems through better integration of security and systems engineering.  
This paper argues for the need to develop a methodology that considers security 
as an integral part of the whole system development process. The paper 
contributes to the current state of the art by proposing an approach that 
considers security concerns as an integral part of the entire system development 
process and by relating this approach with existing work.  The different stages 
of the approach are described with the aid of a case study; a health and social 
care information system.  
1 Introduction  
Information systems (IS) become more and more critical in every aspect of human 
society from the health sector to military. As the use of Information Systems arises, 
the demand to secure those systems also arises. This is true since many information 
systems contain private data that must be available only to authorised viewers. Take 
as an example a health and social care information system containing health data of 
different individuals. Security in such a system, as in any health and social care 
information system, is very important since security breaches might result in medical 
history to be revealed, and revealing a medical history could have serious 
consequences for particular individuals.  
Software Engineering considers security as a non-functional requirement [1]. Non-
functional requirements introduce quality characteristics, but they also represent 
constraints under which the system must operate [2,3]. Although software designers 
have been recognized the need to integrate most of the non-functional requirements, 
such as reliability and performance, into the software development processes [4] 
security still remains an afterthought.  
Thus the usual approach towards the inclusion of security within a system is to 
identify security requirements after the definition of a system. However, considering 
security as an afterthought often leads to problems [7], since security mechanisms 
have to be fitted into a pre-existing design, therefore leading to serious design 
challenges that usually translate into software vulnerabilities [8]. 
There are at least two reasons for the lack of support for security engineering [5]. 
Firstly security requirements are generally difficult to analyse and model. A major 
problem in analysing non-functional requirements is that there is a need to separate 
functional and non-functional requirements yet, at the same time, individual non-
functional requirements may relate to one or more functional requirements. If the non-
functional requirements are stated separately from the functional requirements, it is 
sometimes difficult to see the correspondence between them. If stated with the 
functional requirements, it may be difficult to separate functional and non-functional 
considerations. Secondly developers lack expertise for secure software development. 
Many developers, who are not security specialists, must develop systems that require 
security features.  Without an appropriate methodology to guide those developers on 
the development processes, it is likely that they will fail to produce effective solutions 
[6].   
We believe that security should be considered during the whole development 
process and it should be defined together with the requirements specification. By 
considering security only in certain stages of the development process, more likely, 
security needs will conflict with functional requirements of the system. Taking 
security into account along with the functional requirements throughout the 
development stages helps to limit the cases of conflict, by identifying them very early 
in the system development, and find ways to overcome them. On the other hand, 
adding security as an afterthought not only increases the chances of such a conflict to 
exist, but it requires huge amount of money and valuable time to overcome it, once 
they have been identified (usually a major rebuild of the system is needed).   
However, current methodologies for IS development do not meet the needs for 
resolving the security related IS problems [9], and fail to provide evidence of 
integrating successfully security concerns throughout the whole range of the 
development process. 
In this paper we present an approach that integrates security and systems 
engineering, using the same concepts and notations, throughout the entire system 
development process. This work falls within the context of the Tropos methodology 
[10] in which security requirements are considered as an integral part of the whole 
development process. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction to the Tropos 
methodology describing briefly the methodology stages and its concepts, while 
Section 3 describes a health and social care information system that is used as a case 
study throughout the paper. Section 4 illustrates how our approach integrates security 
and systems engineering within the Tropos development process and Section 5 relates 
our work to the literature by providing an overview of related work. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2 Tropos methodology 
Tropos is a development methodology tailored to describe both the organisational 
environment of a system and the system itself. Tropos is characterised by three key 
aspects [11]. Firstly, it deals with all the phases of system requirements analysis and 
system design and implementation1 adopting a uniform and homogeneous way. 
Secondly, Tropos pays great deal of attention to the early requirements analysis that 
precedes the specification of the perspective requirements, emphasizing the need to 
understand the how and why the intended system would meet the organisational 
goals. This allows for a more refined analysis of the system dependencies, leading to 
a better treatment not only of the system functional requirements but also of its non-
functional requirements, such as security, reliability, and performance [11].  Thirdly, 
Tropos is based on the idea of building a model of the system that is incrementally 
refined and extended from a conceptual level to executable artefacts, by means of a 
sequence of transformational steps [12].   
Tropos adopts the i* modelling framework [13], which uses the concepts of 
actors, goals, tasks, resources and social dependencies for defining the obligations of 
actors (dependees) to other actors (dependers). Actors have strategic goals and 
intentions within the system or the organisation and represent (social) agents 
(organisational, human or software), roles or positions (represent a set of roles). A 
goal represents the strategic interests of an actor. In Tropos we differentiate between 
hard (only goals hereafter) and soft goals. The latter having no clear definition or 
criteria for deciding whether they are satisfied or not [13]. A task represents a way of 
doing something. Thus, for example a task can be executed in order to satisfy a goal. 
A resource represents a physical or an informational entity while a dependency 
between two actors indicates that one actor depends on another to accomplish a goal, 
execute a task, or deliver a resource.  Figure 1 shows the graphical representation of 
the above-mentioned concepts.  
 
 
Figure 1: Graphical Representation of Tropos Concepts 
 
Although Tropos was not conceived with security on mind, a set of security 
concepts, such as security constraint, secure entities and secure dependencies have 
been proposed [14] to enable it to consider security aspects throughout the whole 
development process.  A security constraint is defined as a constraint that is related to 
the security of the system, while secure entities represent any secure 
goals/tasks/resources of the system. Secure goals are introduced to the system to help 
                                                           
1 In this paper we do not consider the implementation stage. Readers interested in this stage can 
refer to [10]. 
in the achievement of a security constraint. A secure goal does not particularly define 
how the security constraint can be achieved, since (as in the definition of goal, see 
[13]) alternatives can be considered. However, this is possible through a secure task, 
since a task specifies a way of doing something [13]. Thus, a secure task represents a 
particular way for satisfying a secure goal. For example, for the secure goal Authorise 
Access, we might have secure tasks such as Check Password or Check Digital 
Signatures. A resource that is related to a secure entity or a security constraint is 
considered a secure resource. For example, an actor depends on another actor to 
receive some information and this dependency (resource dependency) is restricted by 
a constraint Only Encrypted Info.  
A secure dependency [14] introduces security constraint(s), proposed either by the 
depender or the dependee in order to successfully satisfy the dependency. For 
example a Doctor (depender) depends on a Patient (dependee) to obtain Health 
Information (dependum). However, the Patient imposes a security constraint to the 
Doctor to share health information only if consent is obtained. Both the depender and 
the dependee must agree in this constraint (or constraints) for the secure dependency 
to be valid. That means, in the depender side, the depender expects from the dependee 
to satisfy the security constraints while in the dependee side, a secure dependency 
means that the dependee will make an effort to deliver the dependum by satisfying the 
security constraint(s). The above-mentioned security concepts are illustrated in Figure 
2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Graphical Representation of the Security Concepts 
Tropos covers four main software development phases:  
Early Requirements, concerned with the understanding of a problem by studying 
an existing organisational setting. The output of this phase is an organisational model, 
which includes relevant actors, their respective dependencies and the security 
constraints imposed to those actors.  
Late requirements, where the system-to-be is described within its operational 
environment, along with relevant functions and security requirements; this description 
models the system as a (small) number of actors, which have a number of 
dependencies and security constraints. These dependencies define the system’s 
functional requirements, while the security constraints define the system’s security 
requirements.   
Architectural design, where the system’s global architecture is defined in terms of 
subsystems, interconnected through data and control flows. Within the framework, 
subsystems are represented as actors and data/control interconnections are represented 
as (system) actor dependencies. In addition, during this stage, different architectural 
styles are analysed taking into account security and other non-functional requirements 
of the system and secure capabilities are identified and assigned to the different actors 
of the system to satisfy the secure entities.  
Detailed design, where each architectural component is defined in further detail in 
terms of inputs, outputs, control, and the security aspects analysed in the previous 
stages. For this stage, Tropos is using elements of UML [15] to complement the 
features of i*. 
3. Case Study 
This section introduces the case study that will be used in the rest of this paper to 
describe the security analysis process throughout the different stages of the Tropos 
methodology.  
We consider the electronic Single Assessment Process (eSAP) system [16], an 
integrated health and social care information system for the effective care of older 
people. Security in the eSAP is an important concern, since security breaches of such 
system might result in personal and health information to be revealed and this could 
lead to serious consequences. 
It must be noticed that, in our example, many functionalities of the system are 
omitted, since our aim is not to explore the complexity of the system, but rather to 
demonstrate how the Tropos methodology integrates security and systems 
engineering.  
Throughout our case study, the security policy principles identified in [7] are used. 
In addition, some more principles are added: (1) System Authorisation, only 
authorised professionals and patients can access the system; (2) Access Control, each 
Care Plan shall be marked with an access control list naming the people or groups 
who may read it and append data to it. The system should prevent anyone not on the 
list from accessing the record in any way; (3) Care Plan Opening, a professional may 
open a care plan with themselves and the older person on the access control list. 
When an older person has been referred, the professional might open a record with 
themselves, the older person, and the referring professional on the access control list; 
(4) Control, only one of the professionals (most likely the professional responsible for 
the older person) may alter the control list, and add other professionals; (5) 
Information Flow, information derived from care plan A may be appended to care 
plan B if and only if B’s Access control list is contained in A’s; (6) Availability, the 
information must be available whenever a person included in the access control list 
requires any information. 
4. The Development Process 
4.1 Early Requirements 
During the early requirements stage, the goals, dependencies and the security 
constraints between the stakeholders (actors) are modeled with the aid of an actors’ 
diagram [11]. Such a diagram involves different actors, represented as nodes, and 
dependencies, represented as links, between the different actors that indicate that one 
depends on the other to accomplish some goals and also that some security constraints 
must be satisfied for the dependencies to be valid. 
For the eSAP case study, we consider the following actors (Figure 3) 
 Professional: the health and/or social care professional; 
 Older Person: the Older Person (patient) that wishes to receive appropriate 
health and social care; 
 DoH: the English Department of Health; 
 R&D Agency: a Research and Development Agency interested in obtaining 
medical information; 
 Benefits Agency: an agency that helps the older person financially. 
 
 
Figure 3: Actors Diagram 
 
The main goal for the Older Person actor is to Maintain Good Health2 and a 
secondary goal is to Receive Appropriate Care. Since the Older Person cannot 
guarantee either of those goals alone, they depend on the Professional to help them 
satisfy them. In addition, the Older Person depends on the Benefits Agency to Receive 
Financial Support. However, the Older Person worries about the privacy of their 
finances so they impose a constraint to the Benefits Agency actor, to keep their 
financial information private. The Professional depends on the Older Person to 
Obtain (Older Person) OP Information. However one of the most important and 
delicate matters for the older person is the privacy of their personal medical 
information, and the sharing of it. Thus, most of the times, the Professional is 
imposed a constraint to share this information if and only if consent is obtained. On 
the other hand, one of the main goals of the R&D Agency is to Obtain Clinical 
Information in order to perform tests and research. To get this information the R&D 
                                                           
2 It is captured as a soft goal since we cannot precisely define what “good health” means for 
different individuals.  
Agency depends on the Professional. However, the Professional is imposed a 
constraint (by the Department of Health) to Keep Patient Anonymity.   
When the stakeholders, their goals, the dependencies between them, and the 
security constraints have been identified, the next step of this phase is to analyse in 
more depth each actor’s goals and the security constraints imposed to them. In 
addition, secure entities are introduced to help towards the satisfaction of the imposed 
security constraints. In this example, due to lack of space, we focus only in the 
analysis of the security constraints, and not in the goal or task analysis of each 
individual actor.  
The analysis of the security constraints starts by identifying which goals of the 
actor they restrict. The assignment of a security constraint to a goal is indicated using 
a constraint link (a link that has the “restricts” tag). In addition, different alternatives 
can be considered for achieving the goals and the security goals of the stakeholders. 
For example, during the previous step (Figure 3), the Professional actor has been 
imposed two security constraints (Share Info Only If Consent Achieved and Keep 
Patient Anonymity). By analyzing the Professional actor (Figure 4) we have identified 
the Share Medical Info goal. However, this goal is restricted by the Share Info Only If 
Consent Obtained constraint imposed to the Professional by the Older Person. For 
the Professional to satisfy the constraint, a secure goal is introduced Obtain Older 
Person Consent. However, this goal can be achieved with many different ways, for 
example a Professional can obtain the consent personally or can ask a nurse to obtain 
the consent on their behalf. Thus a sub-constraint is introduced, Only Obtain Consent 
Personally. This sub constraint introduces another secure goal Personally Obtain 
Consent. This goal is divided into two sub-tasks Obtain Consent by Mail or Obtain 
Consent by Phone. The Professional has also a goal to Provide Medical Information 
for Research. However, the constraint Keep Patient Anonymity has been imposed to 
the Professional, which restricts the Provide Medical Information for Research goal. 
As a result of this constraint a secure goal is introduced to the Professional, Provide 
Only anonymous Info. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Partial Analysis of the Professional Actor 
4.2 Late Requirements  
In the late requirements stage, the functional, security, and other non-functional 
requirements for the system-to-be are described. The system-to-be is introduced as 
one or more actors who have a number of dependencies with the other actors of the 
organization (defined during the early requirements stage) and it (the system) 
contributes to the goals of the stakeholders.  
In our case study, one of the main aims of the Department of Health is to allow 
older people to get more involved in their care and also help professionals provide 
more efficient care. For this reason, the Department of Health depends on the 
electronic Single Assessment Process (eSAP) system to automate care. Thus, the 
eSAP system is introduced as another actor and it is analysed using the same concepts 
used for the analysis of the other actors. 
Figure 5 shows a partial analysis of the eSAP System. To automate care the eSAP 
system must provide services. This goal can be decomposed into two different goals, 
Provide Services to Professionals and Provide Services to Older People. Both those 
sub-goals must be achieved for the top goal to be achieved. In addition, each of those 
goals can be decomposed to a number of alternative tasks. For example, the Provide 
Services to Professionals goal can be alternatively fulfilled by tasks Assist Schedule 
Meetings, Assist with Assessment Procedures, or Assist with Care Plan Management. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Partial Analysis of the eSAP 
In addition, to satisfy the security of the system, different security constraints are 
imposed to the system (according to the security policy defined in the previous 
section). In our case study, due to lack of space, we only consider the Keep Data 
Private security constraint that is imposed in order to contribute towards the privacy 
of the system. To satisfy this constraint, a secure goal Ensure Data Privacy is 
introduced to the system. This goal can be achieved either through the sub-goal Block 
Access to Data that blocks any access to the system (obviously not desirable); or 
provide access partially, which allows access only from a central computer; or 
perform privacy controls. The latter sub goal is fulfilled by the tasks Use Encryption, 
Check Access Control, Check Information Flow, and Check Authorisation. Each of 
those tasks can be achieved by considering different alternatives. For example, in 
order to check authorisation different alternatives can be considered such as check 
passwords, check biometrics or check digital signatures. An approach to evaluate the 
different alternatives could be to use the measures of complexity and criticality [17].  
Complexity represents the effort required from an actor for achieving a (security) task, 
while criticality represents how the (security) goals of the actor will be affected if a 
(security) task is not achieved. Thus, by knowing how complex and how critical the 
different alternatives are, we can decide which alternative is the best solution. 
4.3 Architectural Design 
The architectural design phase defines the system’s global architecture. During 
architectural design the first step is to identify the overall architectural organization 
by selecting among alternative architectural styles3 using as criteria the non-functional 
requirements of the system identified in the previous stage.  
However, quality characteristics (non-functional requirements) are difficult to 
measure since it is difficult to get empirical evidence during the design stages. For 
this reason, we employ an analysis process based on an independent probabilistic 
model, which uses the measure of satisfiability proposed by Giorgini et al [18]. In our 
example, satisfiability represents the probability that the non-functional requirement 
will be satisfied.  Thus, the evaluation results in contribution relationships from the 
architectural styles to the probability of satisfying the non- functional requirements of 
the system identified in the late requirements stage. We use a weight to express the 
contribution of each style to the satisfiability of the non-functional requirements. 
Weights take a value between 0 and 1. For example, 0.1 means the probability that the 
architectural style will satisfy the requirement is very low (the style is not suitable for 
satisfying the requirement), while 0.9 means the probability that the architectural style 
will satisfy the requirement is very high (the style is suitable for satisfying the 
requirement).  
The analysis involves the identification of more specific non-functional 
requirements, by refining the ones identified during the late requirements stage, and 
the evaluation of different architectural styles against those requirements. It must be 
noticed that the refinement of the security requirements took place during the late 
requirements analysis with the identification of secure tasks, so from the security 
point of view, the alternative architectural styles are evaluated against those tasks.      
The weights of the contribution links reported in Figure 6, of each architectural 
style to the different non-functional requirements of the system, have been assigned 
after reviewing different studies [19,20], evaluations [21], and comparisons [22] 
involving the architectural styles. We must note that Figure 6 represents a partial 
                                                           
3 To avoid confusion we must note that architectural styles differ from architectures in that “ a 
style can be thought of as a set of constraints on an architecture” [19, p. 25] 
illustration of the comparison process. For example, from the security point of view, 
we only consider privacy as in the previous stages of this example development. 
However, when the approach is employed in a complete comparison, all the security 
issues must be taken into account. In addition, we have omitted, in order to keep the 
figure simple and easy to understand, the contributions and the conflicts amongst the 
different non-functional requirements. For example, although privacy contributes 
negative to the mobility requirement, this is not shown in the figure. 
We consider two architectural styles, a hierarchical style –client/server - and a 
mobile code style -mobile agents.  We decided to consider those two since 
client/server is the most frequently encountered of the architectural styles for 
network-based applications [21], while mobile agents form a growing and quite 
different architectural style. In client/server style, a node is acting as a server that 
represents a process that provides services to other nodes, which act as clients. The 
server listens for requests upon the offered services. The basic form of client/server 
does not constrain how application state is partitioned between client and server 
components [21]. Client/server architectural style is also referred to by the 
mechanisms used for the connector implementation such as Remote Procedure Call 
(RPC) [21]. RPC is appropriate for client/server architectural styles since the client 
can issue a request and wait for the server's response before continuing its own 
processing. On the other side, in mobile agents style, mobility is used in order to 
dynamically change the distance between the processing and source of data or 
destination of results.  The computational component is moved to the remote site, 
along with its state, the code it needs and possibly some data required to perform the 
task [21].   
As shown in Figure 6, each of the two styles satisfies differently each of the non-
functional requirements of the system. For instance, the mobile agents style allows 
more scalable applications (weight 0.8), because of the dynamic deployment of the 
mobile code. For example, a doctor wishes to access a large number of medical 
information, filtered according to the content. In the (pure) client/server architectural 
style (weight 0.4), the doctor would access the server data (medical information) and 
all the retrieved information would be transferred to the client. Then the filtering 
would be performed at the doctor site. In the mobile agents architectural style, such a 
filtering can be performed in the server site, where redundant information can be 
identified early and thus does not have to be transferred to the client. The latter 
approach is more scalable since the required filtering is distributed and can be 
performed close to the information sources.    
On the other side, mobile agents style offers a greater opportunity for abuse and 
misuse, broadening the scale of security issues significantly [23]. This is due to the 
fact that mobility is involved. Thus, although protection of a server from mobile 
agents, or generally mobile code, is an evolution of security mechanisms applied in 
other architectural styles, such as client/server; the mechanisms focused on the 
protection of the mobile agents from the server cannot, so far, prevent malicious 
behaviour from occurring but may be able to detect it [23]. For example, the 
information flow property is easier to be damaged by employing mobile agents 
(weight 0.4) since possible platforms that a mobile agent could visit might expose 
sensitive information from the agent [23]. In the case of the client/server style (weight 
0.8) sensitive information is stored in the server and existing security measures could 
be taken to satisfy the information flow attribute.  
 
Figure 6: Deciding for the system’s architecture 
 
When the contribution weights for each architectural style to the different non-
functional requirements of the system have been assigned, the best-suited 
architectural style is decided. This decision involves the categorization of the non-
functional requirements according to the importance to the system and the 
identification of the architectural style that best satisfies the most important non-
functional requirement using a propagation algorithm, such as the one presented by 
Giorgini et al [18]. In our example, security is the number one concern for the eSAP 
system and thus the architectural style that satisfies most the privacy (since we only 
consider privacy in this example) requirements of the system is the client/server style 
(figure 6). In the case that two or more non-functional requirements are of the same 
importance, the presented approach can be integrated with other analysis techniques, 
such as the SAAM [24], to indicate which architectural style is best suited for the 
system-to-be.   
As mentioned by Castro et al [10], an interesting decision that comes up during the 
architectural design is whether fulfillment of an actor’s obligations will be 
accomplished through assistance from other actors, through delegation, or through 
decomposition of the actor into component actors. Thus, when various architectural 
styles have been evaluated, and one has been chosen, the next step of the architectural 
design stage involves the introduction of new actors and their dependencies, as well 
as the decomposition of existing actors into sub-actors and the delegation of some 
(security) responsibilities from the existing actors to the introduced sub-actors.  
Figure 7 shows a partial decomposition of the eSAP system. In this example, 
focused on privacy, the eSAP system delegates responsibility for the Ensure Data 
Privacy secure goal to the Privacy Manager. The Privacy Manager, in order to 
efficiently fulfill the Ensure Data Privacy secure goal, delegates responsibility to the 
Authorisation Manager (to fulfill the check authorisation secure sub-goal), the Access 
Control Manager (to fulfill the check access control secure sub-goal), the Information 
Flow Manager (to fulfill the check information flow secure sub-goal) and the 
Cryptography Manager (to fulfill the use cryptography secure goal).  
The last step of the architectural design is to identify capabilities for each of the 
actors by taking into account dependency relationships of the actors. A capability 
represents the ability of an actor of defining, choosing and executing a plan for the 
fulfillment of a goal, given certain world conditions and in presence of a specific 
event [11]. For example, the Authorisation Manager should have capabilities such as 
obtain authorisation details and provide authorisation clearance. However, the process 
of identifying capabilities for each actor has been extensively described in the 
literature [11,25] and thus it is not described here. 
 
 
Figure 7: eSAP system decomposition to ensure data privacy 
4.4 Detailed Design 
During the detailed design each component of the system, identified in the 
previous stages, is further specified. In Tropos the detailed design stage is based on 
the specifications resulted from the architectural design stage, and the reasons for a 
given component can be traced back to the early requirements analysis.  
From the security point of view, during the detailed design the developers specify 
in detail the actors’ capabilities and interactions taking into account the security 
aspects derived from the previous steps of the analysis.  
For the detailed design stage, Tropos adopt a subset of UML [15] diagrams. In our 
example, a professional might request to view a care plan. The sequence diagram 
(simplified) for this request is shown in figure 8. However, it would be useful to 
denote under what constraints the authorisation is granted. For our example, the 
professional is allowed to access a care plan if and only if the professional’s name is 
included in the care plan access table. For this purpose, we introduce security rules.  
These are similar to the business rules that UML has for defining constraints on the 
diagrams. Graphically, security rules are placed on Notes and attached to the related 
structure as shown in figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 8: Simplified sequence diagram including security rule notation 
5. Related Work 
As stated in the introduction, very little work has taken place in considering 
security requirements as an integral part of the whole software development process. 
However, literature provides some approaches towards this direction. In the current 
state of the art, security properties are, within the requirements engineering process, 
supported by a qualitative reasoning rather than a formal reasoning. Existing formal 
methods support the verification of a protocol, which has already been specified [26], 
while qualitative directions provide a process-oriented approach [1].  
Chung applies a process-oriented approach [1] to represent security requirements 
as potentially conflicting or harmonious goals and using them during the development 
of software systems [1]. Rohrig [27], proposes an approach to re-use existing business 
process descriptions for the analysis of security requirements and the derivation of 
necessary security measures, while Liu et al [28] explore the explicit modeling of 
relationships among strategic actors in order to elicit, identify and analyse security 
requirements. The concept of obstacle is used in KAOS framework [29] to capture 
undesired properties of the system, and define and relate security requirements to 
other system requirements.   
In addition, Jurgens proposes UMLsec [30], an extension of the Unified Modelling 
Language (UML), to include modeling of security related features, such as 
confidentiality and access control. Lodderstedt et al present a modeling language, 
based on UML, called SecureUML [31]. Their approach is focused on modeling 
access control policies and how these (policies) can be integrated into a model-driven 
software development process. 
McDermott and Fox adapt use cases [6] to capture and analyse security 
requirements, and they call the adaption an abuse case model [6]. An abuse case is 
defined as a specification of a type of complete interaction between a system and one 
or more actors, where the results of the interaction are harmful to the system, one of 
the actors, or one of the stakeholders of the system [6].  Also, Guttorm and Opdahl 
[32] define the concept of a misuse case, the inverse of a use case, which describes a 
function that the system should not allow. In their approach security is considered by 
analysing security related misuse cases.     
These above-mentioned approaches only guideline the way security can be handled 
within a certain stage of the software development process. Differently than them, our 
approach covers the whole development process. As mentioned in the introduction, it 
is important to consider security using the same concepts and notations during the 
whole development process. 
6. Conclusions 
Although Security is an important issue in the development of computerised 
systems, currently the common approach towards the inclusion of security within a 
system is to identify security requirements after the definition of a system. However, 
as pointed earlier, this approach leads many times to problems and systems full of 
security vulnerabilities. It should be possible to eliminate such problems through the 
integration of security concerns at every phase of the system development. To achieve 
this goal, methodologies must provide developers (even those not expert on security) 
guidance through a systematic process, which will integrate security and systems 
engineering at every phase of the system development cycle.   
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a process that integrates 
security and systems engineering, using the same concepts and notations, in the entire 
system development process. The integrated security process in Tropos is one of 
analysing the security needs of the stakeholders and the system in terms of security 
constraints imposed to the system and the stakeholders, identify secure entities that 
guarantee the satisfaction of the security constraints and assign capabilities to the 
system to help towards the satisfaction of the secure entities. This process is 
characterized by five key ideas. Firstly by considering the overall software 
development process it is easy to identify security requirements at the early 
requirements stage and propagate them until the implementation stage. This 
introduces a security-oriented paradigm to the software engineering process. 
Secondly, Tropos allows a hierarchical approach towards security. Security is defined 
in different levels of complexity, which allows the software engineer a better 
understanding while advancing through the process. Thirdly, iteration allows the re-
definition of security requirements in different levels therefore providing a better 
integration with system functionality. Fourthly, consideration of the organisational 
environment facilitates the understanding of the security needs in terms of the security 
policy. In addition, functional and non-functional requirements are defined together 
however a clear distinction is provided. 
Future work includes applying our process to different case studies to refine it and 
also integrate our extensions to the Formal Tropos [33] specification language to 
enable us to formally evaluate it. The formal part of the work will also allow us to 
prove and check the properties of the system.    
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